Introduction and background
The Fiji trade union movement, the strongest expression of organized labour in the South Pacific Islands, is facing its biggest threat to its existence. This comes from the State which since May 1987 has been a . military backed rcgimẽ. However the State's response to trade unions should be understood within the historical context of the growing power and assertiveness of the labour move. ment in Fiji. This was epitomized when the Fiji Trades Union · Congress (FI'U, C) sponsored the founation of a Fiji Labour Party (FLP) in 1985, which, along with sections of the National Federation Party (NFP), was elected as the Coalition Government in 1987.
The perception of this as a victory for labour and a change in direction from ethnic based politics is fundamental to analysing subsequent developments in Fiji. However, most discussion of the coups has failed to address adequately the importance of workers' organizations in the foitnation of the FLP and their significance after the coups. This paper follows on from ẽarlier research into the history of trade unions and especially that of Fiji's most powerful union, the Fiji Public Service Association (FPSA) . The thrẽat to trade unions in Fiji can be traced through the strategies the State has adopted to weaken this union.
It could be argued that given the past importance of the FPSA to Fiji's labour movement, its survival will be an indicator of the future patterns for labour there. This Public sector unionism in Fiji 51 acceptance of power bargaining which resulted in gradual wage increases and improvements in employment and living conditions for workers.
By independence in 1970 the labour movement in Fiji did not appear to foreshadow a serious threat to the neo-colonial order. In contrast to many other colonies, Fiji lacked an identifiable nationalist movement which might have encompassed labour militancy (Munck, 1988, p.165-171) . Documentation to date suggests that popular organizations such as unions were excluded from the independence negotiations, but the 1970 constitution guaranteed the right of free association.
The honeymoon was brief. Independence did not herald a decade of docile industrial relations but gave way to the emergence of a more confrontational style. New labour legislation, particularly the Trade Disputes Act 1973, sought to constrain the parameters of conflict between workers and employers. This made it very difficult for workers to take industrial action, especially in essential services, and weakened joint trade union action by outlawing solidarity strikes. . The same year saw the implementation of unilateral restrictions on free collective bargaining with the counter Inflation Act. Imposing wage and salary freezes, or non-negotiable guidelines on increases came to be a feature of industrial relations in Fiji. Lines between management and labour had been sketched in the public sector with the founation of the Public Service Co. m. mission (PSC) in 1960, but were funaly drawn in 1975 when the FPSA asserted its independence by establishing a full-time secretariat.
The first half of the 1970s was a period of several stonny labour disputes, but by 1976 a conciliatory situation appeared to be reached with tripartism guiding wage negotiations and many other industrial relations : matters. ' The Tripartite Forum consisted of representatives from the FI'UC, the employers and government and although it opened the way to dispute solving through its Committee on Industrial Relations, increasingly unions became disillusioned as employers peoceived the Forum as a vehicle for imposing restraints on wages and salaries (FPSA, Annual Rẽport, 1978) . This did not constrain the FPSA from secwing an impressive record of resolving grievances and disputes in its members' ' favour, , as well as p~essing for salary rises and improved conditions. Any illusions of a cordial relationship between civil service unions and government were soon crushed during prolonged and bitter negotiations in the early 1980s over the implementation of substantial salary increases recommended through what came to be known as the Nicol and Hurst Award. The FPSA's claims were successful, but this marked · the beginning of a period of increased hostility between government and public sector unions (Howard, 1985; Leckie, 1988) . When faced with much broader economic problems, ẽspecially inflation and unemployment, the State laid the cause of a unilateral wage and salary freeze in November 1984 at the doors of the FPSA. This marked the end of tripartism. This was the most direct cause of the FTUC's reassessment of its relationship with the State and its withdrawal from the Tripartite Forum. Although the boycott was only while the wage freeze remained in folice, the Government responded by withdrawing recognition of the Fl'UC as the national union body. Other related developments, such a volunteer teachers' scheme and increased bus far, es for schoolchildren led to public sector workers becoming increasingly concerted in their criticism of government policies. When workers endorsed the FI'UC's call for a general strike, the Prime Minister, Ratu Mara, threatened to declare a state of , emergency, bring in the army and sack civil servants (Fiji Times, 10 January 1985) .
With few , alternatives, in August 1985 the Fl' 1 UC launched the FLP to represent the inter, ests of workers and provide an ẽffective opposition to the ruling Alliance Party. Until then the . main opposition party was the NFP. Although it had claimed to draw on multi-ethnic and trade union support, by the mid-1980s it offered no real political alternatives and was viewed as an Indo-Fijian party. Many unionists believed that the subsequent coalition between FLP and sections of the NFP became crucial if unions were to retain the advances they had made and to extend these to other sectors of Fiji's Rabuka's biographers also state (1988. p.33 ) that the Labour Party was mainly backed by the FPSA. Certainly since the early 1980s the FPSA had become increasingly critical of the Government's policies and advocated that ttade unions, particularly rank and file members, should seek to change wider economic and social inbalances in the nation (FPSA, Annual Report, 1985, p.15) . While the FPSA became a cornerstone of the FLP, it did not singly launch the new party. It was founded and supported by a number of unions affiliated to the FI'UC, along with representatives of other groups disenchanted by Alliance policy (Lal, 1986, p.139-157; Robertson and Tamanisau, 1988, p.18-42) .
Nevertheless the link between the FPSA and the Coalition appears to have been a serious threat to entrenched and powerful interests in the public service, which had developed under Alliance rule. A major platfonn of Bavadra's campaign focused on accusations of corruption linking politicians, bureaucrats and private concerns (Hagan, 1987, p.13-14) . The Coalition's promise to investigate this if it assumed power implied a considerable reshuffle of the civil service. Rabuka cites this as one reason for staging the coup:
The Coalition would move in their own people, and place then1 in prominent positions and further their political goals, and use their influence to change the directions of Fiji's political, economic and previously excellent foreign relations (Dean and Ritova, 1988, p.46) .
The FPSA was considered a threat not only because of its role in the formation of the FLP but also because of its willingness to endorse the policies of a Coalition government. The FPSA had drawn attention to corruption and inappropriate goveanment and management policies years before the FLP was fointed.
Coalition plans to introduce changes in the bureaucracy and implement new social policies were shattered by the coup on 14 May 1987, but the coup did not deter the "union threat". This was partly because sections of the labour movement overtly criticized and organized opposition to the military regime. Monck (1988, p.176) has observed that the ability of military regimes to stabilize may be dependent on the capacity of the labour movement to restructure itself and mount a resistance campaign. During the immediate post-coup chaos, trade unions were one of the few multi-ethnic opposition groups with some kind of institutional structure, even if in most cases this was weak. The FPSA, and some, mainly white-collar unions, were exceptions. Chaudhry, quickly reinstated as general secretary of the FPSA, along with other union colleagues rapidly mustered international trade union support to put pressure on the illegal regime. At the FI'UC's request cargo and passenger bans were instigated by New Zealand and Australian unions. The effects were dramatic on an island nation heavily dependent upon imports and foreign exchange generated from tourist revenue and exports (Howard, 1988, p.187-190 and p.l98-200) . Even after the bans were lifted, unions were able to use this as a (ITF) . The threat of international industrial action was also significant in pressuring the government to desist from implementing repressive legislation against union activity in the public sector (FPSA, Annual Report 1989, p.41-2) .
The administration's perception of trade unions as a threat was brought home in statements by Taniela Veitata, the fottner trade unionist turned Minister for Employment and Industrial Relations, when he described international union concern with labour matters in Fiji as tantamount to "war" (Fiji Times, 2 May 1989) . A more sinister manifestation of this was in a military document submitted by army officers to Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara on 28 May 1989. This attacked, among others, trade unionists, claiming that Chaudhry's threat of a national strike against the Gov, ernment's non-rẽstoration of pay increments was an example of a politically motivated move to challenge the Government. The document also raised the Communist bogey supposedly lurking behind international trade union links, and proposed its own solution:
We believe that the threat of further Trade Union strike action can be effectively countered by abolishing the Trade Union Movement in Fiji and establishing , a government agency within the Ministry of Labour to look after the interest of all the workers.2
Apparently Veitata had been consulted on labour matters by the writers of this document
The FPSA and Chaudhry's role in the Fiji labour movement has also been strengthened tollowing a split in the FI'UC which led to Chaudhry's elẽction as general secretary of the Congress in January 1988. Along with other new appointments, this led to the FI'UC adopting a som, ewhat more aggressivẽ and critical stand during the past two years and extending its educational, training and other programmes {FIUC, 1989) . Chaudhry is also general secrẽtary of the National Fanners' Union which is refusing to cut cane during 1990. The administration is implying that their non-acceptance of an unsatisfactory sugar award and Chaudhry's threats of international bans on Fijian sugar exports is a plot to topple the regime (Fiji Times, 11 June 1990) .
Unions have represented a significant source of opposition to a government which came to power behind the gun and will consolidate this through implementing discriminatory legislation to disenfranchise many Fijian citizens. As Munck notes (1988, p.l76) , although labour unrest may not always be the direct cause of military intervention, it is usually a significant underlying element. Certainly the Fijian regime has blamed labour and the unions for precipitating the coups and for post-coup economic hardship) In practice, however, there has been little concrete evidence of unions taking . militant action to destabilize the regime. Words have been their main weapon and Chaudhry continued, as before the coup, to be the principal unionist publicly attacking a wide range of policies and practices, particularly in the public sector. He questioned the accountability of public finances, the transfer of resources from social services to the The most pressure put on unions since the coup bas been through the dueat and use of physical force. This was by no means new but circumstances in 1987 gave another dimension to direct coercion as a means to control trade unions. The burgeoning militarization of the State (Robertson and Tamanisau, 1989) gready increased the potential for direct force. During the period when the sight of soldiers, guns and roadblocks was commonplace and when civil liberties and human rights weae curtailed, abuses against trade unionists were common. Few bade union leaders in 1987 bad any experience of direct militant action and had never openly threatened the regime with violence. The biggest weapon they had was to mobilize international solidarity. Partly to inhibit this and also to intimidate workers from participating in pro-democracy activities, the military regime resorted to physically harassing trade union officials and directly prohibiting them from engaging in a wide range of acdvities.
The most immediate direct constraint on trade union activities was when S union officials were delivered at gunpoint notices of suspension by the Civil Aviation Authority of Fiji (CAAF) in May 1987. This was on the grounds that the officials constituted security risks but it is now more probable that the following comments made in an unsigned letter to D.P. Singh, the president of the FPSA, were closer to the truth:
It is clearly victimisation of Union Official and activities, brin1in1 in personalities. Check the Madhoji Report. Whatever name you fmd in there u a Union wimess, you will also fmd in the aupended lilt. Whoever wu active in Union matters, His name is in the suspended lilt. 4 The suspension of these officials also severely affected the ability of the FPSA to take industrial action in this sensitive sector of the public service. 1988) . After being faced with internal and international pressure, the Internal Security Decree was suspended in November, but the threat of such coercive power being reactivated remains when there is no legitimate guarantee of human rights.9 This was borne out in early 1989 when Rabuka threatened to reactivate the Internal Security Decrees if workers supported the FPSA and FI'UC calls for a genezal strike (Fiji Times, 8 April1989) . A year later a civilian government ostensibly governed Fiji when Rabuka returned to the barracks, but he soon warned that the military would intervene if trade unionists attempted to destabilize the country by going on strike (Fiji Times, 23 January 1990) or if cane farmers refused to harvest cane (Fiji Times, 30 May 1990). Veitata's most recent warning to Chaudhry is ominous: "That should he persist in his illegal activities, he and his organization will face the strongest possible action of a future that both are unlikely to win" (Fiji Times, 13 June 1990).
"Legal" coercion While the adminisbation found that it met obstacles in sustaining trade union compliance based on physical coercion, it met fewer problems in imposing "legal" coercion on public sector workers. A crucial step was the promulgation of the Public Service Order which 8 File note, S 108/1043, FPSA, Suva, 29 SepteJnber 1987. 9 Correspondence from FPSA to Pl'l1, 26 April1989 (S410, FPSA, Suva).
Public sector unionism in Fiji 57 revoked the Public Service Act, along with subsidiary legislation. This removed a number of key conditions of service which public sector unions had secured in previous years and indirectly eroded the protection unions could offer members. The new order cancelled appeals against appoinunents, promotions, transfers and gradings, while it also facilitated the arbitrary reduction of salaries by 15 percent in 1987. New disciplinary offences were stipulated, including "any other offences specified by the Commission." While an earlier provision under the Public Service Regulations 1987 provided for the establishment of a Disciplinary Appeals Board, by mid-1989 the PSC had shelved this proposal (FPSA, Annual Report, 1989, p.26) , which further strengthened the arbitrary role of the PSC. Relev, ant here is Decree 5 of 1987 under which many members of the PSC were appointed by the Commander and Head of State of the military government. With the public service decrees remaining in force, PSC members continued to exercise lithe provisions of these decrees quite indiscriminately, the military appointees to the Service Commissions have wreaked (sic) havoc on the public service" .tO
The decree also promulgated drastic changes in the composition of the civil service which would af~ect FPSA membership. Although the 1970 Constitution provided for racial parity in the public sector, the 1987 decree insisted that at least 50 percent of all positions at all levels be filled by indigenous Fijians or Rotwnans. Employees were also required to retire at 55 instead of the established 60 years. The following quotation circulated in CAAF by an anonymous writer exemplifies the paranoia about the power of the FPSA and the need for the PSC to weaken this:
' The present civilian government through the Public Services Commission have constructively and systematically severed the tentacle hold of the FPSA through the new 1987 Public Services Act whilst the FPSA has endeavoured to use the media for local and overseas support and all part of ' the orchestrated effort to erode the Military power that is the security foundation of the present civilian government. II As several reports of the FPSA note, in practice, even regulations were unneccesary for those sympathetic to the administration, as they used "favouritism and cronyism" to confi1nr1 promotions and appoinunentsl2 (see also FPSA, Annual Report, 1989) .
Although assuring international unions that it would protect human and trade union rights, the Fiji administration nevẽr relented in its attempt to control public sector unions. In April 1989 the Government announced its intention to amend legislation in order to prevent several categories of workers from joining trade unions and also to sevẽrely restrict the right to strike of frre-officers, forest guards, workers classified as managers, or dealing with confidential matters. Ultimately it would be up to the secretary of the PSC to designate a post as falling within one of these categories. A further drastic curtailment to industrial action was the classification of all sectors of the civil service as essential services, meaning that 28 days strike notic, e would have to be
The latest infringements on trade union rights drew strong condemnation from both the FPSA and international trade union bodies. To justify its action the Fiji Government misinterpreted International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions:
The recent amendments to the trade union laws were based on ILO Convention 98, which bars public servants from forming trade unions and, ILO Convention 151, which allows only certain levels of public servants to be unionized.l3
However this contravenes the I 16th Report of the ILO Freedom of Association Committee which concluded that although Convention 98 may permit (not bar) the exclusion of public servants engaged in the administration of the State. , a ruling of the Committee of Experts states "that the exclusion from the scope of the Convention of persons employed by the State or in the public sector who do not act as agents of the Public Authority is contrary to the meaning of the Convention." This means that the distinction is between civil servants employed in various capacities in government ministries and other persons employed by the government. The Committee of Experts has also decided that Convention 151 does not overrule the articles of Convẽntion 87, (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, 1948) in respect of the public service. According to the 181st report of the Freedom of Association Committee, the standards in Convention 87 apply to workers "without distinction whatsoever" and are applicable to employees of the State14 (also see ILO, 1988}. In its attempt to weaken the Fiji labour movement, the Fiji Government also warned the PSI and the New Zealand Public Service Association (NZPSA) that any further international trade union action would be construed as interfering in Fiji's sovereignty. This did not deter Colin Clark from the NZPSA reiterating to Veitata that his union would continue to be guided by unionists in Fiji. IS Hans Engelbert, general secretary of the PSI, warned that he could pull strings at a higher level:
Your country's membership of the ILO and our recognition under the ILO Constitution allow us to take such initiative to protect the rights of our affiliates and this we shall certainly continue to do in any part of the world where the trade union rights of our members are threatened.
He warned that the PSI could apply pressure through United Nations organizations and the resources of PSI's membership in nearly 70 nations. ' The outcome was that the international trade union secretariats advised affiliates to protest to the Fiji administration. Although the April 1989 amendments were shelved, they could still be implemented without notice.
While the threat of military intervention, detention and other coercive measures · were activated to stamp out trade union activities, in the longer te11n the direct threat to trade union rights in the public sector came from regulations and the threat of reactivating more coercive ones. Surveillance of these moves by unions both within and outside Fiji has been able to counteract the severity of some of the draconian measures. If not for the persistence of the FPSA and the influence it has within the FfUC, then the passing of time may have led to an acceptance of these infringements, similar to much of the Fiji public's resignation to living under a military backed regime.
Victimization
The FPSA has also been unrelenting in fighting what it identifi, es as cases of victimization of union officials and members even when the industrial relations machinery in the public sector has made it extremely difficult to seek redress. The scope for victimization has increased greatly in the post-coup atmosphere, where "bullyism" can range from physical threats, to blocked transfers, promotions, re-grading, unclear or constantly changing job descriptions (so that an officer can not perfoun duties adequately) to the threat of disciplinary action. This has been given an enlarged potential when no appeals machinery exists. For example after being suspended and then reinstated in employment with CAAF in 1987, MuthuSwamy, the President of Labasa branch was given notice of transfer to Suva. Chaudhry considered this to be victimization of a union official but the only recourse was to take legal action (FPSA National Council minutes, 10 September 1988). Since the coup FPSA members and officials in Savusavu (a small town on the island of Vanua Levu) have reported being harassed by senior departmental officers but when resistance was shown, the branch president, Aisea Baitisaresare was transferred to Navua on Viti Levu (FPSA National Council Minutes, 18 August 1989).
Victimization against union supporters was by no means new in the public service in Fiji or elsewhere (Bain, 1970, p.132-33) . As FPSA records indicate, there were several instances of members being wrongly disciplined, forced into early retirement, facing unacceptable transfers either to another task (which could be more onerous, of less responsibility or more isolating) or to a remote part of Fiji. The 1986 Madhoji Report is replete with claims of victimization in CAAF, which is partly why this report was not released until the Coalition assumed power. As outlined in a general survey of the Customs and Excise Department in 1986-87, victimization also operated through positive discrimination in favour of those who supported their superiors. These bureaucratic patrons might offer for example, appointments, promotions, or leave to attend educational courses. Such favouritism had much greater scope after the coups. Conversely, the same report noted that junior officers could be made to do the work of senior officers because the Principal Collectors had certain officers blacklisted because of union activity or personality clashes.
Fear of victimization did have an impact on dampening members' overt support for the FPSA and as union officials noted, this tactic of union control made it difficult to recruit and keep liaison officers and branch officials (FPSA, Annual Report, 1987, p.l6; National Council Minutes, 10 Õctober, 1988) . It was also a factor behind the poor attendance noted at branch meetings, , as in these smaller communities it was easier to identify people's political sympathies. Life could also become intolerable for · those being constantly harassed, especially where there was no network of sympathetic colleagues. For example, Chaudhry had contemplated closing the Labasa branch as its officials had been ineffective since the coups. This was attributed to fear of victimization by their employer.
Industrial relations practices and union control
Some of the abovẽ fotnts of exerting coercion over labour are outside any fotntal industrial relations machinery. Other methods of control hav, e been heightened by the removal or non-operation of established industrial relations practices, particularly in the public sector. Therẽ ar, e still a number of instances where the Fiji regime, principally through the PSC, has utilized the industrial relations machinery in an attempt to weaken strong union representation. This suggests that institutionalized industrial relations may serve as a means of controlling potential labour unrest (Carter, 1985, p.165-67) .
As noted, the Tripartite Forum initially appeared to offer a structure through which labour, employers and the State could resolve a number of industrial relations issues. Once the State dispensed with the Forum to negotiate wage guidelines, by imposing a unilateral wage and salary freeze in November 1984, tripartism ceased to be a cornerstone of Fiji's industrial relations system. Instead, by 1986 the State held annual National Economic Summits, which, among other matters, discussed wage policies. Although union representatives were invited, as the summit included participants from a wide range of community organizations, this can be seen as a move to dissipate the role of unions.
In 1989 Ratu Mara admitted that plans were underway to broaden the representation of the summit so that it might replace the Tripartite Forum.l6
A major impact on industrial relations since the coup has been the virtual abeyance of established dispute and negotiating machinery. The avoidance of these established practices is a further way of rendering unions ineffectual. In short, the FPSA and other unions are ignored as legitimate worker representatives when it suits the administration. The FPSA has noted that since the coup, employers have exacerbated the already entrenched practice of making their own interpretation of collective agreements and of breaching their provisions. In early 1988, the general secretary reported "widespread breaches of collective agreements in almost every statutory body. Employers have taken undue advantage of the current political and economic conditions, using it as a weapon to rẽduce employment conditions of their employees" (FPSA, Annual Report, 1988, p . . 31) .
The FPSA still tried to register these clear breaches of collective agreements as disputes with the Permanẽnt Secretary of Employment and Industrial Relations, but a number of means have been used to avoid settling these. Many reported disputes have been rejected on the grounds that management has acted in accordance with government directives. This occured when the FPSA was blocked in registering a dispute over the suspension of members at CAAF, due to directions from the PSC or from Rabuka. Here, a . matter which unions perceiv· ed as within their legitimate sphere of concern was deemed as falling within "national security" and therefore exempt from established dispute settling procedures. Alternatively the Ministry of Labour may use stalling tactics to defer taking further action or reaching a decision. This has been a favoured tactic of management in the past, especially by the PSC. Other ways of avoiding negotiation and settlement have been the outright refusal by the Pe1 auanent Secretary of Employment and Industrial Relations to stipulate why a dispute has not been accepted, as when he refused to send parties in a National Marketing Authority dispute to arbitration (FPSA, Annual Report, 1988, p.20) .
What steps can unions take, especially with the demise of the Tripartite Forum? Legal action is an avenue which the FPSA has repeatedly explored since the coup. Even this was impossible when the judiciary was suspended for a brief period after the second coup. Resorting to the judiciary process is also cumbersom. e and time-consuming, especially in a country which has a greatly understaffed and pressured court system. It is also extremely costly, and while a large union such as the FPSA may have the financial resources to take legal action, this is not an option for smaller unions or those whose members can not afford to contribute high union dues. Frustration at being hamstrung in working through the usual industrial disputes machinery has also precipitated the FPSA into gaining its members' mandate to take industrial action.
Consultative machinery has been a special feature of labour relations in the public sector. The Central Whitely Council, introduced in 1966 mainly to deal with staff relations, was later reconstituted as the Joint Consultative Council. This body has not met since August 1987 and is unlikely to be revived. Alternative joint negotiations by staff associations have been dissipated through the PSC holding separate meetings with them. Individual employees cases only are discussed while policy matters are arbitrarily decided by the Commission. FPSA officials have also been frustrated by the confrontational and rigid stance taken by PSC representatives in monthly meetings. Union delegates have found that this gave little scope for genuine dialogue as PSC officials appeared to have been given a fixed mandate from which to argue. The same obstructions seemed to hinder any headway being reached in conciliation meetingsl7 (see also FPSA, Annual Report, 1988, p.20 (FPSA, Annual Report, 1987, p.27 ). There have been fewer hurdles for the registration of some recent ethnically based unions, including the Viti Civil Servants Association (VCSA) and the Fiji Air Traffic Controllers Association (FA TCOA). This was in spite of protests from existing unions that the Registrar is not impartial, as these new unions are contravening the Trade Union Act. FATCOA's 28 members were all founer members of the FPSA while by early 1990, 7 of its members were still members of the FPSA. Despite FPSA's insistence that FATCOA was encroaching on areas and categories served by the FPSA, it was still rẽgistered as a trade union.18 Like many developing countries, the Registrar of Trade Unions in Fiji, plays a pivotal role in the regulation of a compliant union movement (Bean, 1985, p.217 ).
Ethnicity and splinter groups
Employers and the State. , generally did not often have to resort to coercion to exert control over labour organizations in Fiji. Encouraging the fo1anation of splinter groups within workers' organizations has been a tactic repeatedly pursued by management. As noted, Fiji's colonial development, centred on the institutionalization of ethnic divisions betwẽen indigenous Fijians. , Indo-Fijians and "others"., has given a solid base upon which ethnic fractionalism has often been promoted by the State and other employẽrs. The appeal to ethnicity as a means of dividing workers' organizations became more overt once demands for some kind of political representation were made by workers in Fiji (Durutalo, 1986) .
Attempts by senior Fijian civil servants to fragment the FPSA along ethnic lines surfaced long before the political unrest in Fiji of the second half of the 1980s (Leckie, 1987; . Ethnic ties which stressed loyalty to the chiefs and the State were drummed up whenever the civil service thrẽatened or went ahead with industrial action. Communal tensions were again brought into play by a "concerned group" led by 10 ethnic Fijian members in 1986. Their platfoiin was to purge politics from lrade unions and the civil service but more specifically they sought to remove Chaudhry as General Secretary. This aimed to destroy the executive control held by the National Council and the secretariat's influence in the FPSA. The fonnation of a Suva branch would enablẽ the "concerned group" to build up its own power base and be relatively autonomous from the National Council. Further plans included the withdrawal of the FPSA from the Fl'UC which would destroy one of the main cornerstones of the increasingly assertive union movement. ' This was particularly timely with widespread support by public sector workers for the recently fonned FLP and with an impending general election.
Copies of documents of the "concerned group" suggest a more planned strategy, dating fro. m the year before the coup, to destabilize the FPSA and much of the union support for the FLP. First, the legality of the 1986 annual general meeting of the FPSA was to be questioned so that it could be declared null and void; secondly, under "future development" were plans to "decentralise to four divisions" so that government would withdraw recogniton of the FPSA. Ethnic Fijian "contacts"', many in senior bureaucratic positions, were also identified. A meeting with civil servants on 26 April 1986 in Nadi decided to fonn a breakaway Fiji Civil Servants' Association.
The rise of the Taukei movement during 1987 and its endorsement by the military regime, gave more open support by the authorities for the foiination of a union to rival and possibly weaken the FPSA. On 9 July 1987 at the Fijian Teachers' ' Association building, members of the "concerned group" who had been expelled from the FPSA founded the Viti Civil Servants' Association. It emerged when the military regime and the PSC were trying to impose a 25 percent salary cut and other retrenchment measures on the civil service (Fiji Times, 7 July 1987) . When the FPSA and other civil service unions threatened a nationwide strike, the PSC, in the wake of an ultimatum which threatened the redundancy of 12,000 officers, went ahead with the imposition of a 15 percent salary cut. Meanwhile the VCSA and the Public Employees' Union willingly acquiesced to pay cuts and proposed that civil servants give up other allowances they were entitled to (Fiji Times, 10 July 1987; 13 July 1987) . Although it claimed political neutrality, a number of sources suggest that the VCSA was backed by senior members of the PSC. On 17 August 1987 a member wrote to Chaudhry concerning a group which was trying to destabilize the union: "It is very clear that P.S.C. staff have been asked from the top to divide the Association."l9 Taniela Tabu, the secretary of the VCSA, was also a senior civil servant in the PSC and the official side secretary in the Joint Consultative Council. The interim president was the Peunanent Secretary for Health, Dr Filimone Wainiqolo. As noted, the attitude of the PSC towards the civil service unions suggested that the PSC was coming under the direct control of the military regime. As well as encouraging splinter groups, the PSC was simultaneously encouraging management to promote the regime's policies by, for ẽxample, issuing circulars and having pocket meetings with staff. The identity of management with Fijian ethnicity and a hostile attitude towards the FPSA has also been facilitated by the "purge" of senior Indian civil servants from the civil service and attempts to introduce legislation prohibiting managers from being union members.
Since the VCSA proclaimed its loyalty to the regime (Fiji Times, 10 July 1987; 13 July 1987) it is not surprising that the union's registration was accepted. According to the Trade Union Act, any 7 persons may fo1n1 a union but must then seek registration. This can be refused if another trade union is already registered and adequately representative of the whole, or a substantial proportion of the interests pertaining to those seeking registration of a new union. The VCSA, like other exclusively ethnic Fijian unions, justified their claims on the grounds that:
Under the Trade Union (Recognition) Act there is nothing to stop an employer from accepting racial grouping as a basis for recognition of a trade union if a racial group feels that a particular multi-racial grouping for trade union purposes does not protect their interests (Fiji Times, 4 May 1989). To substantiate this, Tabu argued that trade unions had been monopolized by Indians because of their numerical domination of the workforce. Indian commiunent to the labour movement was dismissed as manipulation to suit their own "racial needs" (Fiji Times, 4 May 1989) . The PSC also overlooked a stipulation under the Trade Union (Recognition) Act that a union should represent 50 percent or more of the employees for whom recognition is sought when it faunally recognized the VCSA (Fiji Times, 25 March 1988) .
The bark of the VCSA has been bigger than its actual bite. Although its recruitment activities have been effective in trimming the membership of the FPSA, as elaborated below, the reduction in FPSA membership is not solely due to VCSA activities . .
Chaudhry has questioned Tabu's claims (Fiji Times, 28 April 1990) of having 1010 members in the · vcsA. This included new civil service recruits, who were more likely to be ethnic Fijians or Rotumans and more susceptible to anti-FPSA propaganda. FPSA records also indicate that some newly recruited members of the VCSA have returned to the fold of the FPSA. Some of these "swinging" members have been opportunistic.
They have joined the VCSA in the hope that this might facilitate promotions or other favours but have then rejoined the FPSA, especially once they realized that they might lose valued socio-economic benefits. FPSA attraction also lies in its greater experience and superior resources to fight individual as well as collective grievances.
Nevertheless, the VCSA still continued to be a thorn in the FPSA's side, with members being pressured to support government policies and the VCSA. Increased Taukei influence in management has also widened the scope for VCSA supporters victimizing FPSA members. At the very least, this means that FPSA members can be intimidated against criticizing the VCSA. The presence of a VCSA group in a department can also inhibit recruitment and overt support for the FPSA. At another level, the VCSA also operates as a propagandist of the administration and condemns criticism of policies directed at the public sector and its employees. They also staunchly endorse policies which advance the appointment and promotion of indigenous Fijians. The FPSA never questioned the necessity of this but has criticized the pace of indigenization, the discriminatory practices this leads to, and what are considered to be adverse effects on the quality of public services in Fiji. The VCSA has also clearly separated itself from the FPSA' 's approach to industrial action by passing resolutions at the 1989 and 1990 annual general meetings opposing national strikes and advocating the dismissal and replacment of civil servants taking part in any national strikẽ (Fiji Times, 1 July 1989; 28 April 1990) .
According to FPSA sources, the VCSA was responsible for circulating a number of malicious rumours, petitions and circulars to facilitate the ẽasy withdrawal of groups of members from the FPSA. Chaudhry has questioned the authenticity of somẽ of these signaturẽs and suggested, for example, that defamatory statements and some of the 26 signatures of members in the Public Works department on a letter may have been the work of the vCSA. Their rẽasons for resignation were similar to those given in some bulk withdrawals from other departments: This is due to the fact that you have used the FPSA, to further your political interest, under the guise of Union Solidarity. Furthermore, your dictatorial and unscrupulous acts, deviates from democracy, but could be found behind the iron curtain. You should, after all practice what you preach. FARE THEE WELL COMRADE.20 Rumours also helped the VCSA to foun the Good Samaritan credit Union. Supposedly, its rival, the Fiji Public Service Credit Union, had been misusing funds in early 1987 although it did announce record dividends during this period (Fiji Times, 6 February 1988) .
Since the coup, there have been other attempts to fo11n unions exclusivẽly for Fijians, such as the Fijian Sugar Workers' Union (Fiji Times, 4 May 1989). Just as the VCSA was advised by the Fijian Teachers' Association, so the VCSA is keen to promote the fotnaation of breakaway unions for ethnic Fijians. In opposition to the FI'UC, the Viti Trades Union Council was set up by the FTA. , Fijian Sugar Workers' Union, Native Land Trust Board Staff Association, Fijian Affairs Board Staff Association, Air Pacific Viti Employees' Union and Fijian Registered Port Workers' Union. Tabu saw these unions playing their part in busting any anticipated strikes and pledged that the VCSA would mobilize all Fijian workers by activating the Viti Trade Union Council if the F·ruc went on strike. This declaration coincided with the FPSA serving a strike notice (Fiji Times, 28 April 1990) and the possibility that farmers would boycott the 1990 cane harvest.
Appealing to ethnic ties has been a powerful tactic in promoting splinter groups from powerful trade unions such as the FPSA. Other rival groups ẽncouraged by management do not necessarily cater to one ethnic group, although much of their support may come from indigenous Fijians. For example, CAAF recognized FATCOA, although FPSA had objected to its registration as a trade union.21 Another rival union in the aviation industry has been dismissed by the FPSA's Nadi branch as solely aiming to fragment FPSA solidarity.22
A further divisive tactic by the Government aimed at weakening trade union solidarity, especially within the public sector, has been to play upon difterences between established and unestablished staff. This does not neatly correlate with perceived ethnic categories but has been tied in with attempts to stir up divisions between workers who have been categorized as "blue collar" and "white collar". Most of the unestablished staff in the public sector are "blue collar" and represented by the Public Employees' Union. There were several instances prior to the coup when the PEU accepted wage restrictions, through fear of redundancies (Leckie, 1988, p.l58) . In return, the PEU was supportive of the Alliance Government and have never called a strike. Their loyalty was assured after the coup when the PEU accepted pay-cuts and advised its members "to stay away from active politics. Any direct action now can only make matters worse and prolong the current crisis" .23
Other divisive forces had the potential to weaken trade unions in Fiji. These factions have been an interplay of internal and external pressures, sometimes playing upon ethnic loyalties, at other times reflecting attempts to stir up divisions between the so-called blue and white collar workers and private and public sector workers. Political affiliations may be an underlying motivation, as for example, when some trade unionists, such as Mahendra Sukhdeo, attempted to discredit the FLP in early 1987 by claiming it was dominated by the "white collar elitist" FI'UC (Fiji Sun . , 8 January 1987) . After the coup, the Fl'UC came close to being severely ruptured by internal divisions. These sprang not only from Taukeist unionists but also from other long-standing, ideological and personal differences between executive members. A key issue centred on the pressure the FI'UC would take against the regime, especially over the degree of industrial action that the FI'UC would call for locally and internationally. When the president, Jale Told. , announced that the FI'UC would shelve its threatened strike, he contradicted the views of several affiliates (Fiji Times, 13 June 1989; 14 June 1989 ). Toki's reluctance to keep the strike threat was shared by a recently fotaned Association of Private Sector Unions, led by FI'UC officials deposed in early 1988, former Treasurer, Bob Kumar, and fot1ner General Secretary, James Raman (Fiji Times, 10 October 1988; 12 September 1988) . This group pressed for the removal of several members of the FI'UC management, especially Chaudhry, on the grounds that their political activities were adversely affecting the FI'UC (Fiji Times, 6 June 1989). Chaudhry claimed that the Government's refusal to rẽcognize the Congress and its attempts to send individual invitations to a National Economic Summit was a ''government ploy to create divisions within the union movement" (Fiji Times, 12 June 1989) .
Within the FPSA, exẽcutive members, Tupeni Tavutonivalu and Jese Ligari, publicly discredited Chaudhry's union duties and his affliation to the FLP (Fiji Times, 4 August 1989). Sources suggest that such internal rifts represent part of a strategy to tum the FPSA into a compliant puppet of the regime. These personal attacks were reiterated by Fijian members of the Board of Fire Commissioners of Suva when they filed a petition de, manding the suspension of Chaudhry. This occurẽd in a year which began with a strike and a go-slow by the Board's employees and led on to the FPSA challenging several management decisions (FPSA, Annual Report, 1988. , p.36) . 
Membership levels
How can we assess the impact of these moves to weaken trade unions, especially the FPSA in Fiji? Although threatened by physical coercion and hamstrung by repressive legislation, the FPSA has persisted in trying to pursue individual and collective grievances. Its leadership has also continued to be outspoken about wider issues in Fiji, especially those which affect the material welfare and political rights of workers. The fact that members and officials still report instances of victimization suggests that union members have not been silenced into complete submission. In 1989 members voted a 50 percent rise in union deductions, indicating their confidence in the management and activities of the FPSA. The increase in union dues also ẽnsured a steady income necessary with rising inflation, and extra costs incurred for legal support and socioeconomic projects. Additional revenue has also been essential to counteract declining membership lẽvels, particularly if the Association aims to maintain and expand the quality of its services.
The effects of attempts to weaken the union , are shown in the dramatic falls in membership levels since the coup. As table I indicates, FPSA membership has fallen by 2552, or 36 percent, between 1986 and 1989 . Membership declines were higher in the civil service (37 percent) compared to statutory bodies (27 percent). Excluding statutory bodies, the civil service had, by early 1989, 4492 FPSA members (77 percent) compared to 1341 non-members (23 percent).24 The drop for 1990 will be even greater if the association is unsuccessful in its bid to regain about 1053 members from the fo1 1ner Department of Posts and Telecommunications employed since January 1990 in the new company, Fiji Posts and Tẽlecommunciations Limited. Li.kẽ trends elsewhere, the privatization of public services in Fiji opens the way to changes in labour organizations, with the potential wẽakening and decentralization of strong encompassing unions.
Anti-FPSA elemẽnts have attributed the fall in membership to disenchantment with the union, but as noted, there have been a number of other factors, stemming from developments since the coups, which have contributed to membership loss. A principal factor has been the substantial number of resignations and retirements from the civil service since the coups. It is likely that most of these were union supporters. . Many vacant posts have not been renewed or filled, as shown in the declining size of the civil service since 1987. ' The changing ethnic composition of the service (table 4), due to the high percentage of Indo-Fijians (72 percent) among those resigning or retiring (table 2) , along with a marked increase of ethnic Fijians as new appointments (table 3) , also had implications for the success of union recruitment. The FPSA still recruits many of these as new members. , but there arẽ greater setbacks in attracting appointees who may havẽ developed anti-union prejudices during the past few years. Some may also perceiv· e support of the FPSA to be "un-Fijian" and consequently be more responsive to overtures from the VCSA.
The activitiẽs of the V· CSA have also encouraged block resignations of ẽthnic Fijians from the FPSA. Initially this was confined to departments where Fijian employees predominated, such as Public Works, Health . and Primary Industries. Letters of resignation (which were often copies of one another) protested at the perceived political involvement of the association. Nẽvertheless, the FPSA's 1988 Annual Report revealed that while there had been a decline of 1113 compared to 1987, that only 267 members (or 24 peroent of those who had resigned) had left the FPSA but were still in service (FPSA. Annual Report, 1988, p.19) and not all of these necessarily joined another union. Around April 1989 there was a noticeable increase in individual resignations which included a rise among Indo-Fijians and £emales. Their letters stressed that because of financial hardship they could not meet the proposed increases in fees by the FPSA. While the FPSA responded to this membership drop by invoking a membership drive, it faced further setbacks with management policies in mid-1989. . Until then the Association monitored current and potential membership by having access to the monthly employment printout for the civil service. When this SP.rvice was refused by the Peuuanent Secretary for Finance in August 1989. , the FPSA suggested that this was because of a cabinet direction to protect the VCSA and not cooperate with the FPSA.25 Although the FPSA found alternative means to keep track of these records, such action has increased the workload of the union secretariat.
There have also been instances of managem. ent facilitating union withdrawals and wrongfully ceasing union deductions. . According to thẽ FPSA's constitution, members should individually sub. mit a letter of rẽsignation to the Gẽneral Secretary. When. , for example, the Per.manent Secrẽtary for Posts and Telecommunications was advised by Chaudhry that he had wrongfully stopped 135 members deductions26 he then provided staff with union withdrawal fot n1s. These were on a circular which also thanked staff who had signed a petition to the FPSA calling for the lifting of trade bans against Fiji by overseas unions. Chaudhry described this as: very provocative, it directly serves to undermine the unity and solidarity of members ... Your decision and action to furnish such forms, whether intentionally or unintentionally is a direct attempt to weaken the Association because it encourages and facilitates membership withdrawai.27
Fighting back
Falling membership numbers, along with other divisive tactics aimed at weakening the FPSA, have boosted moves by the union to reverse these trends. By late 1989, the FPSA embarked upon a membership drive which sought to dissuade members from resigning and to sign up non-members, especially new civil service recruits.
Another strategy to strengthen the union has been restructuring. There has been an effort to revive the role of liaison officers, the organizers at the office-floor level. While some branches such as Labasa appear to have been weakened by dissident elements, others, especially Nadi and . Lautoka have been strengthened through the establishment of full-time secretariats since late 1988. A further move to encourage members' participation, has been the reactivation of the Women's Wing in early 1988 and proposals for a Youth Wing. Emphasis has also been given to strengthen union education and training courses within Fiji since 1988.
One of the most important drawcards for union membership, recently expanded by the FPSA, has been socio-economic benefits for its members. While pragmatically these are incentives to attract and retain members, these projects also grew from a conviction, ardently advocated by a former FPSA president, Bava~ that unions should take a broader role than simply being concerned with workplace matters. Socio-economic schemes would play an educational role, both for members and as models of alternative structures for the wider public. The oldest scheme which is administered separately from the FPSA is the FPSA Credit Union, but its origins owe as much to the enthusiasm for credit cooperative schemes in Fiji than to any specific union ideology. A change in the direction of socio-economic projects, partly because of Bavadra's influence, developed in July 1988 with the establishment of Fiji's frrst union-controlled medical centre in Suva along with similar services for branch members and their families. Other union benefits include assistance for overseas medical treatment, a retirement benefit, a bereavement payment to spouses and housing assistance through the FPSA Investment Cooperative Association.
The membership and publicity drive, restructwing of the union and increased socioeconomic benefits have been some of the means by which the FPSA has tried to retain its membership. As this paper documents, the FPSA has counteracted attempts to weaken it and the Fiji labour movement through many other means. It has firmly maintained its assertive stand on the salaries and conditions of its members, personal and wider grievances, general conditions in the public service and trade union rights and issues affecting the general public. As far as possible, the FPSA has attempted to utilize established industrial practices although since the coup it has resorted to legal action to an unprecedented extent. While the breakdown of much of the industrial relations machinery has affected all unions in Fiji, the FPSA has faced specific obstacles in relation to its changed relationship with management and the especially the PSC. The style of the FPSA has generally been to keep channels open for dialogue and to threaten industrial action only when further discussions were delayed or blocked. While consultation between the FPSA and the PSC has been eroded since the coup, there have been positive improvements in labour relations in statutory bodies, especially within CAAF.
Given the restraints to negotiation, members at post-coup meetings have endorsed resorting to industrial action to restore salary levels and other conditions. This is not a radical departure from the past but does indicate that the association is detei •nined not to be cowered into taking a submissive stance. In April 1990, the FPSA filed a 28 day strike notice in response to government's refusal to grant civil servants a 6 percent pay increase pe11uitted to other workers in 1988 and to allow civil servants the 12 percent increase in allowances payable under a wage order issued in 1989. The strike notice was rejected by the Ministry of Employment and Industrial Relations on the grounds that there is a court case pending on the issue. Chaudhry kept the strike notice as he maintained that the Ministry and the PSC were in collusion as the court action was challenging the authority of the Ministry of Finance to impose regulatory wage increases and to frustrate provisions of a contract of employment. Striking was not resorted to, as the administration finally agreed to the pay increase (FPSA, Annual Report, 1989, p.lS-16; Fiji Times, 31 March 1990; 20 April 1990; 4 June 1990) .
Partly because of the virtual impossibility of legally going on strike, the FPSA has retaliated to attacks on unions by taking the debate to a wider level. One of the biggest strengths it has is that its general secretary holds the same position with the FI'UC. This has reinforced links which public sector unions have developed with external union and labour organizations. Ultimately this means that trade unions in Fiji can muster international solidarity and sanctions if pressed.
Trade bans are a last resort and international bodies are reluctant to take this step until all other avenues are exhausted. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFI'U), to which the FI'UC is affiliated, has played a critical role in monitoring trade union rights and labour conditions in Fiji and in facilitating dialogue between the unions and government An ICFI'U mission to Fiji in October 1989 secured a statement of intent from the Economic Strategy Committee of Cabinet. This aimed to restore recognition of the FI'UC as the sole reprẽsentative body of unions and workers in Fiji, rẽstore trade union rights, reactivate tripartite bodies and recognize ll..O standards in future reviews of industrial laws and procedures (Pacific U. nio.nist, 1989, p.l) . To date, government has not implemented these agreements, which is reminiscent of the "false respectability" displayed by government in previous assurances given to the ICFI'U.28 The regime's lack of commiunent to agreements made with international labour bodies has been spelt out by recent threats to ban the ICFI'U from Fiji (Fiji Times, 9 June 1990).
Cõnclusion
During the past 3 years, the regime in Fiji has given a taste of the lengths it is prepared to take to squash challenges to its hegemony. Labour-State relations are a far cry from the comparatively consultative style under tripartism during 1976-84. Even then, strains were becoming marked. The abandonment of tripartism, moves towards unilateral decisions by government and threats of bringing in the army pushed unions into seeking redress to economistic problems through political ends. Material issues were not the only ones, as unions, ẽspecially the FPSA, saw their legitimate concern to be corruption, State and management policies and after the coup, human and democratic rights.
What is the biggest threat to unions in Fiji today? This paper has documented manoeuvres to fragment unions, ẽspecially along ethnic lines. ' This had some impact on the FPSA but not as much as anti-union dissidents had wished. Changes in the labour market, the setting up of new industries in tax -free zones and the restructuring of government bodies will grẽatly weaken the labour movement unless it is able to adjust its own style to attract and maintain workers' support. The State has resorted to ouuight coercion and could ban unions but this might lead to the kind of international pressure even Fiji's ardent union-bashers wish to avoid. On the other hand, recent Taukei extremists saw the solution in creating a leadership vacuum by deporting some labour leaders, such as Chaudhry.
Unions, particularly the FPSA, have built up a strong base and have drawn upon years of experience to counter attacks directed at them after the coup. Throughout most of their history they have faced hostility and negative images, especially from the press. In 1985, many observers saw anti-unionism stemming from those with political control and realized that the labour movement would have to secure a political base if it was to avert a pattern of State-labour relations heading in the dirẽction of Singapore where "unions would be tolerated but their power would be significantly curbed" (FPSA, Annual Report, 1987, p.12) . Today, unions have lost their political base and the promulgation of a new constitution leaves little hope of operating within a sympathetic political context. Although the political constraints are being tightened, it is likely that further constraints will be placed upon the operations of trade unions in Fiji. The record has shown that after being blocked from seeking redress through the legal machinery or through the courts, when unions pull out their ultimate wẽapon, the threat of local or international industrial action, this is construed by their opponents as a politically ẽngineered move to topple the regime. When unionists speak out about trade union rights or other inequalities then this is also labelled political (see letters to editor Fiji Times, 13 September 1988; 19 August 1988) . In order to protect their members' interests, trade unions in Fiji are fighting for their survival but this is most unlikely to lead to a "deal" with Fiji's forseeable political leaders. Their survival and struggle is very much a political issue, particularly as they will have to operate within a political structure they have never endorsed, and are unlikely to endorse.
